

identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
20 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Rm. A3042  
Washington, DC 20529

PUBLIC COPY



U.S. Citizenship  
and Immigration  
Services

H2

FILE:

Office: LOS ANGELES, CA

Date: DEC 07 2004

IN RE:

APPLICATION: Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under Section 212(i) of the  
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)

ON BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert P. Wiemann".

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the Interim District Director, Los Angeles, California. The matter is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who was found to be inadmissible to the United States pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having attempted to procure admission to the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is the spouse of a naturalized citizen of the United States and seeks a waiver of inadmissibility in order to reside in the United States with her husband and children.

The interim district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the Application for Waiver of Grounds of Excludability (Form I-601) accordingly. *Decision of the Interim District Director*, dated July 14, 2003.

On appeal, counsel states that Citizenship and Immigration Services abused its discretion in finding that the applicant's husband and children would not suffer "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" if the applicant were removed to Mexico. *Form I-290B*, dated August 12, 2003.

In support of these assertions, counsel submits an affidavit of the applicant's spouse, dated September 4, 2003; a copy of the marriage license of the applicant and her spouse; a copy of the naturalization certificate of the applicant's husband; copies of the United States birth certificates of the applicant's children; letters of support; copies of financial and ownership documents for the applicant and her spouse and photographs of the applicant and her family. The entire record was considered in rendering a decision on the appeal.

The record reflects that on November 7, 1995, the applicant attempted to obtain entry into the United States with a Border Crossing Card belonging to another individual. During a secondary interview, the applicant again failed to disclose her true identity and was detained under the name of another individual.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in pertinent part:

- (i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides:

- (1) The Attorney General [now the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary)] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General [Secretary], waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General [Secretary] that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

A section 212(i) waiver of the bar to admission resulting from violation of section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of the applicant. Hardship the alien herself experiences upon deportation is irrelevant to section 212(i) waiver proceedings; the only relevant hardship in the present case is that suffered by the applicant's spouse. Once extreme hardship is established, it is but one favorable factor to be considered in the determination of whether the Secretary should exercise discretion. *See Matter of Mendez*, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

*Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez*, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999) provides a list of factors the Board of Immigration Appeals deems relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act. These factors include the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

The applicant's spouse contends that he would suffer as a result of separation from his spouse. *Affidavit of Jose Pedro Carrillo*, dated September 4, 2003. He states that he is dependent on the applicant for his emotional and family needs. *Id.* The AAO notes that the record fails to substantiate the claim of the applicant's spouse that he would suffer extreme emotional and/or psychological hardship through documentation including, but not limited to evidence of treatment by a mental health professional. The applicant's spouse asserts that he believes in keeping his family united and that separation would break his heart. *Id.* The AAO acknowledges the statements of the applicant's spouse, but finds that his assertions standing alone do not support a finding of extreme hardship. *See Matter of Treasure Craft of California*, 14 I&N Dec. 190 (Reg. Comm. 1972).

The record fails to make any assertions of hardship imposed on the applicant's spouse as a result of relocation to Mexico in order to remain with the applicant.

U.S. court decisions have repeatedly held that the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. *See Hassan v. INS*, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991). For example, *Matter of Pilch*, 21 I&N Dec. 627 (BIA 1996), held that emotional hardship caused by severing family and community ties is a common result of deportation and does not constitute extreme hardship. In addition, *Perez v. INS*, 96 F.3d 390 (9th Cir. 1996), held that the common results of deportation are insufficient to prove extreme hardship and defined extreme hardship as hardship that was unusual or beyond that which would normally be expected upon deportation. *Hassan v. INS*, *supra*, held further that the uprooting of family and separation from friends does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship but rather represents the type of inconvenience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported. Moreover, the AAO notes that the U.S. Supreme Court held in *INS v. Jong Ha Wang*, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship. The AAO recognizes that the applicant's spouse would endure hardship as a result of separation from the applicant. However, his situation, based on the record, is typical to individuals separated as a result of deportation or exclusion and does not rise to the level of extreme hardship.

A review of the documentation in the record fails to establish the existence of extreme hardship to the applicant's spouse caused by the applicant's inadmissibility to the United States. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether she merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. *See* Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.